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REORGANIZATION TREATMENT OF ACQUISITIONS OF
STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN INSTITUTIONS BY MUTUAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The acquisition (mutual-stock acquisition) of a stock savings and
loan institution (stock institution) by a mutual savings and loan associ-
ation (mutual association) has received inconsistent treatment' under
the reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).2
Specifically, the disagreement is whether mutual passbook account
shares (mutual shares) received by the stock institution shareholders
should be characterized as primarily-debt or primarily-equity instru-
ments. 3 This is a result of the "hybrid" nature4 of mutual shares,
which represent both an ownership interest5 in the association similar
to stock, and a debt interest6 similar to savings deposits.
1. Compare Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1983)
(merger of stock into mutual not a reorganization), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271
(1984) and Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104 (same) with West Side Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 405 (6th Cir. 1974) (merger of stock into mutual
a reorganization) and Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971)
(same) and Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 972 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (same); see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders 14.11, at 14-21 & nn.25-26 (4th ed. 1979); Chappell, Judicial
View that S & L Passbook Accounts are not "Stock" Complicates Reorganization, 44
J. Tax'n 372 (1976). Currently over $20 million in tax revenues are at stake in more
than 670 cases on different levels of appeal within the Internal Revenue Service. Wall
St. J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 8, col. 2. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the
issue. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984).
2. I.R.C. §§ 354, 361, 368, 381 (1976). See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice,
supra note 1, ch. 14 (definition, treatment of and special problems in corporate
reorganizations).
3. See Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (debt
characteristics overwhelmingly predominate), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984);
West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974)
(mutual shares represent definite and material proprietary interest); Everett v.
United States, 448 F.2d 357, 358-60 (10th Cir. 1971) (proprietary rights make mutual
shares voting stock); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473
F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979) (same); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 607 F.2d 970, 974-75 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (rejecting government's argument that
mutual shares are debt).
4. See Paulsen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 291, 298 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); Capital
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979); B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-21.
5. West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th
Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Capital Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
6. West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th
Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Capital Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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In order to qualify as a tax-deferred reorganization, 7 the acquiring
corporation must either continue the business of the acquiree or use a
significant portion of the acquiree's assets." In addition, the acquiree's
shareholders must retain a continuing proprietary interest in the ac-
quiror.9 Receipt of an equity interest typically will satisfy this require-
7. Although these transactions are commonly referred to as tax-free reorganiza-
tions, in actuality they are tax-deferred reorganizations. See L. Solomon, Corporate
Acquisitions, Mergers and Divestitures 74,001 (1983). No gain or loss is recognized
at the time of the transaction. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. The
acquiree shareholder's adjusted basis in the property given up, however, is carried
over to his interest in the acquiring corporation. I.R.C. § 358(a) (1976). At the
corporate level, the adjusted basis of the assets in the hands of the transferor is carried
over to the acquiring corporation. Id. § 362(b). The unrecognized gain will be taxed
when the taxpayer ultimately disposes of the property, because taxable gain is
computed by subtracting the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property from the
amount realized on the disposition. Id. § 1001(a).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(2) (1983); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1,
14.51, at 14-129 to 14-130; L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,160, at 74,159-61; see
Tarleau, "Continuity of the Business Enterprise" in Corporate Reorganizations and
Other Corporate Readjustments, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 792, 792-99 (1960); see, e.g.,
Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 740 (1947) (new form of previous participa-
tion in an enterprise); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d
Cir. 1932) (continuity of interest in assets of business), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1933); Standard Realization Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 708, 715 (1948) (sale of
assets after exchange destroys continuity); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1983)
(new enterprise is substantial continuation of the old). The acquiror need not con-
tinue the historic business of the acquiree, Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252,
253 (2d Cir. 1955); Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D. Tex. 1961); see
United States v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc., 400 F.2d 737, 743 (8th Cir. 1968), but must
merely continue in a business utilizing the assets of the acquiree. L. Solomon, supra
note 7, 74,160, at 74,159-61. One court has noted that "[a]ll that is required is that
the [acquiror] receive and continue to use some minimum amount of the [acquiree's]
assets." Laure v. Commissioner, 653 F.2d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1981).
9. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 409, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d
970, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20. The
judicially-created continuity of proprietary interest doctrine requires "a showing: (1)
that the transferor corporation or its shareholders retained a substantial proprietary
stake in the enterprise represented by a material interest in the affairs of the trans-
feree corporation, and, (2) that such retained'interest represents a substantial part of
the value of the property transferred." Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner,
189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951);
see LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462, 470 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932). See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra
note 1, 14.11, at 14-17 to 14-21, 14-27 to 14-28 (discussion of the development of
the continuity of interest doctrine).
The regulations also require a plan of reorganization which "must be adopted by
each of the corporations . . . and appear upon the official records of the corpora-
tion." Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(a) (1983). See generally Manning, "In Pursuance of the
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ment, while receipt of a debt interest typically will not.'0 Treatment
of this transaction under the Code's reorganization provisions, there-
fore, is dependent on the characterization of a mutual share as debt or
equity."
This problem has arisen in two types of transactions. Pursuant to a
statutory merger, the stockholders of a stock institution may, after
tendering their stock, receive mutual shares in the acquiring mutual
asgociation.' 2 Alternatively, the stock institution might transfer sub-
stantially all of its assets to the mutual association in exchange for
mutual shares.' 3 In either case, the mutual shares are issued in an
Plan of Reorganization"- The Scope of the Reorganization Provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 885-96 (1959) (detailed discussion of the
requirement of a plan of reorganization).
An additional judicial doctrine, now set out in the Treasury Regulations, that must
be satisfied is that the underlying transaction be "required by business exigencies."
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1983); see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)
(must have some business or corporate purpose); Wortham Mach. Co. v. United
States, 521 F.2d 160, 162-63 (10th Cir. 1975) (taxpayer must show a valid business
purpose); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572
(2d Cir. 1949) (sole motive cannot be to escape taxation), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955
(1950); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1983) (necessary to conduct of the enterprises); B.
Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.51, at 14-127 (transaction must have a
legitimate corporate purpose); L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,165, at 74,161 (same).
10. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970,
974 (Ct. Cl. 1979); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20; see, e.g.,
LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1940) (bonds and cash not sufficient
interest); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935) (preferred stock
a satisfactory interest); Pinellas Ice & Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462,
470 (1933) (short-term purchase-money notes insufficient).
11. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970,
974-76 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20.
Under the general definitions of the Code, "corporation" is defined to include "asso-
ciations," I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1976), shareholder to include "a member in an associ-
ation," id. § 7701(a)(8), and stock to include "shares in an association," id.
§ 7701(a)(7). Mutual shares, therefore, are defined as stock under the Code.
12. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 452 F. Supp.
32, 33 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (1980); see Capital Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979). In relevant part, a reorgani-
zation is defined as: "a statutory merger or consolidation [or] ... the acquisition by
one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock . . . , of
substantially all of the properties of another corporation." I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), (C)
(1976).
13. See West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 406
(6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971); Rocky
Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo.
1979); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1976).
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amount equal to the fair market value of the stock or assets transfer-
red.' 4 Reorganization treatment provides for nonrecognition of gain
or loss on the exchange of stock at both shareholder' 5 and corporate
levels. 16 In addition, at the corporate level, the stock institution's tax
attributes are carried over 17 to the acquiring mutual association. Con-
temporaneous taxation of the acquisition, at the corporate or share-
holder level, can thwart an otherwise desirable business combination.
Part I of this Note demonstrates that a stock-mutual merger satisfies
the continuity-of-business-enterprise requirement. Part II delineates
the continuity-of-proprietary-interest requirement, examines the na-
ture of mutual shares and concludes that the required interest is
present in a mutual-stock acquisition. In addition, several safe harbor
restrictions that can be placed on mutual shares in order to avoid a
debt characterization are proposed.
I. CONTINUITY OF BuSINESs ENTERPRISE
The reorganization provisions presume that after the transaction,
"the new enterprise, the new corporate structure and the new prop-
erty are substantially continuations of the old still unliquidated.' 8
The principle underlying the shareholder provisions 9 is that an inves-
tor should not be taxed when his capital remains invested in the
acquiring entity2°-continuity of proprietary interest.2' At the corpo-
14. See West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 406
(6th Cir. 1974) ($200 par value stock exchanged for $2,500 per share); Capital Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (transferors received
accounts in the amount of $56.36 per share of $10 par value stock transferred).
15. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1976) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in
another corporation a party to the reorganization.").
16. Id. § 361(a) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a
reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely
for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization.").
17. Section 381(a) of the Code states that "[i]n the case of the acquisition of assets
of a corporation by another corporation. . . the acquiring corporation shall succeed
to and take into account, [the corporate tax attributes described in section 381(c)] of
the distributor or transferor corporation . . . ." in a transfer to which section 361
applies. I.R.C. § 381(a) (1976). These items include the transferor's net operating
losses, method of accounting, depreciation, and investment tax credit. Id. § 381(c).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1983); see McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1982); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Com-
missioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
19. I.R.C. §§ 354, 368 (1976).
20. See Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 89 (1937); McDonald's Restau-
rants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1982); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1002-1(c) (1983); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.01, at 14-6; E.
Krader, S. Leimberg, A. Parker & M. Satinsky, Stanley & Kilcullen's Federal Income
Tax Law 7-6 (1983).
21. See supra note 9.
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rate level, 22 taxation is inappropriate when the transaction involves
solely a change in the structure of the corporate entity23-continuity
of business enterprise.24
If a transaction qualifies as a reorganization, the transferor corpo-
ration recognizes no gain or loss under section 361 .25 In addition, the
tax attributes of the acquiree carry over to the acquiror under section
381. 2' This allows the acquiree to avoid recapture of certain previ-
ously beneficial tax deductions and credits.2 7 A mutual-stock acquisi-
tion's failure to qualify as a reorganization results in immediate taxa-
tion of the gain on the transfer of assets as well as a significant tax
liability triggered by recapture of the institution's reserve for bad
debts. 28 The current cost of a taxable combination, therefore, may
outweigh its potential benefits.
Section 361 applies to transactions in which the acquiree corpora-
tion either transfers its assets or merges with the acquiror. 29 Congress
recognized that in either situation the acquiree corporation acts as a
mere conduit: It transfers the consideration received from the acquir-
ing corporation to its own shareholders. 30 Section 381 reflects a con-
22. I.R.C. §§ 361, 368, 381 (1976).
23. See Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 , 130 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1983); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1,
14.01, at 14-4.
24. See supra note 9.
25. I.R.C. § 361(a) (1976).
26. Id. § 381.
27. See supra note 17.
28. See West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 49-50 (9th Cir.
1961); Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D. Cal.
1963); Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 936 (Ct. Cl.
1961). Savings and loan institutions are allowed a deduction for losses on outstanding
loans in computing their income. I.R.C. § 593(b) (1976). The deduction is based
upon a percentage of the institution's taxable income for the year. Id. § 593(b)(2).
This method results in an outstanding reserve for bad debts when the deductions
taken exceed the actual amount of loans that have become uncollectable. This
amount must be recaptured when the institution is sold. See West Seattle Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1961); Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 223 F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961). A taxable sale or disposition
of property could also trigger recapture of depreciation, I.R.C. § 1245 (1976) and
investment tax credit, id. § 47. Thrift institutions typically do not place a significant
portion of their assets in depreciable property. See Moody's Bank & Finance Manual,
a9, (Vol. 1, 1983) (less than 5% of industry's total assets are depreciable). Recapture
of these items, therefore, is not as significant as recapture of the bad debt reserve,
which is based on taxable income.
29. I.R.C. § 361 (1982).
30. S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
266, 277; B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.32, at 14-102.
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gressional intent that the acquiring or successor corporation step into
the "tax shoes" of the acquired corporation when the reorganized
entities are economically integrated into a unified business enter-
prise.31 This is precisely what occurs in a mutual-stock acquisition.
The resulting mutual association is the economic integration of the
two separate savings and loan enterprises. Both entities are thrift
institutions carrying on the same business prior to the merger. The
resulting entity continues to perform these functions following the
merger. Congress intended that such transactions not be subject to
taxation because the business is simply continuing under a modified
corporate form.32
Moreover, the IRS has accorded reorganization treatment to mer-
gers of mutual associations into stock institutions. 33 The sole difference
A merger typically involves the absorbtion of the acquiree by the acquiror, B.
Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.12, at 14-31; F. Davis, Business Acquisitions
Desk Handbook 4 (2d ed. 1981); H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 346, at 713 (2d ed.
1970); see R. Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations § 193, at 918
(2d ed. 1949), with the acquiree's shareholders becoming shareholders or creditors of
the acquiror, B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.12, at 14-31 to 14-32, and is
commonly referred to as an "A" reorganization, see I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1976); B.
Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.12, at 14-32, F. Davis, supra, at 2.
An acquisition of assets under I.R.C. § 368 (a)(1)(C), typically referred to as a "C"
reorganization, see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.14, at 14-48; F. Davis,
supra, at 18, involves the transfer of substantially all of the assets of the acquiree to
the acquiror solely in exchange for voting stock of the acquiror. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C)
(1976); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.14, at 14-48; F. Davis, supra, at
18-19. The economic consequences of A and C reorganizations are similar, B. Bittker
& J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.14, at 14-48, because a liquidation of the acquiree
typically follows a C reorganization, with the consideration received being distrib-
uted to its stockholders. 13 B. Fox & E. Fox, Business Organizations, § 4.04[1], at 4-
59 (1983).
This consistent treatment of the two types of transactions allows the form of the
transaction to be governed by business and legal considerations and not solely by tax
consequences. It may be more desirable to acquire a corporation's assets because a
merger may carry with it contingent and undisclosed liabilities of the acquiree. See
B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.05, at 14-14; L. Solomon, supra note 7,
71,701, at 71,305. Additional non-tax factors affecting the form of a merger are the
requirement for shareholder appproval, id. 71,050, at 71,051, convenience, id.
71,250, at 71,151, the handling of unwanted assets, id. 71,300, at 71,151, and
accounting considerations, id. 71,500, at 71,152.
31. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 [hereinafter cited as 1954 Senate
Report], reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621, 4683; B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, supra note 1, 16.10, at 16-15 to 16-17.;
32. See Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 130 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-18.
33. Rev. Rul. 69-646, 1969-2 C.B. 54, 55. This transaction is identical to a stock-
mutual merger except for the form of the resulting enterprise. Each mutual share-
holder exchanges his mutual shares for passbook accounts in the stock institution
bearing the same withdrawal value as their mutual shares. Id. In addition, they
receive stock in the institution based on their distributive share of the mutual associa-
tion's undistributed earnings and appreciated assets. Id.
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between this transaction and a mutual-stock acquisition is the organi-
zational structure of the resulting entity-stock or mutual form. The
substantive operations of the resulting enterprises are otherwise identi-
cal.3 4 Congress intended the reorganization provisions to apply con-
sistently and to "depend less upon the form of the transaction than
upon the economic integration of two or more separate businesses into
a unified business enterprise."' 35 At the corporate level, therefore,
reorganization treatment should be applied to both transactions be-
cause the continuity of business enterprise requirement is satisfied.
Sections 361 and 381 apply jointly only to transactions classified as
reorganizations. 3 A transaction cannot be treated as a tax-deferred
reorganization at the corporate level and a taxable sale at the share-
holder level. The continuity of proprietary interest requirement,
therefore, must be examined to determine the appropriat6 characteri-
zation of the entire transaction.
II. CONTINUITY OF PROPRIETARY INTEREST
A stock institution is a corporation organized under state law37 and
authorized to issue capital stock. 38 Stockholders hold the equity of a
stock institution, while depositors of the institution are creditors. A
mutual association, on the other hand, is organized pursuant to fed-
eral39 or state banking laws 40 and does not issue capital stock. 41 The
34. See H. Russell, Savings and Loan Associations 3 (1960). Both organizations
are traditionally grouped together in discussions of the thrift industry. See C. Hen-
ning, W. Pigott & R. Scott, Financial Markets and the Economy 132-33 (2d ed. 1978)
(stock and mutual institutions included in description of savings and loans); Varta-
nian, The Restructuring Of Savings Institutions, 39 Bus. Law. 827, 827-33 (1984)
(discussing mergers of both types of institutions).
35. 1954 Senate Report, supra note 31, at 52, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 4684; see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-18; L.
Solomon, supra note 7, 74,155, at 74,155.
36. I.R.C. §§ 361, 381 (1976); see id. § 368(a)(1) (defining reorganization).
37. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-5201 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1151.02
(Page 1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 33.08.030 (Supp. 1983); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 13-
6-101 (1977); see Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 972-73
(Ct. Cl. 1979); H. Russell, supra note 34, at 3.
38. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-5402, 17-5421 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1151.20 (Page 1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 33.48.030 (Supp. 1983); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 13-6-202 (1977); see Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 494 F.2d 404, 406 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 607 F.2d 970, 972-73 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
40. E.g., Ala. Code § 5-16-4 (1981); Cal. Fin. Code §§ 5400-5403 (West Supp.
1984); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1151.81 (Page 1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 33.08.030 (Supp. 1983).
41. E.g., Ala. Code § 5-16-16 (1981); Cal. Fin. Code § 5109 (West Supp. 1984);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1151.81 (Page 1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 33.04.005
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association consists of the depositors of the institution who hold sub-
stantially all of the equity interest in the association as represented by
mutual shares. 42 Each depositor holds a "hybrid" security. 43 He is both
a creditor and an owner of the association. As an owner, the mutual
shareholder possesses the right to vote, 44 the right to share in the
earnings of the association, 45 and the right to share ratably in any
liquidation proceeds. 46 As a creditor, he has a qualified right to liqui-
date his account at any time,47 and in some jurisdictions, his claim
may not be subordinated to that of a general creditor. 48 In addition,
dividends paid to the shareholders are deductible in computing the
(Supp. 1983); Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
494 F.2d 404, 406 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607
F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
42. Borrowers may be considered members of the association, see H. Russell,
supra note 34, at 239, and granted voting rights, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1983);
Ala. Code § 5-16-13(e) (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1151.47.1 (Page 1968).
43. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 291, 298 (1982), rev'd on other grounds,
716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); Capital Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979); B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-21.
44. E.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 781 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 204.
45. E.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. & Loan v. United
States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979); H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2.
46. E.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2.
47. Mutual associations may require members to give notice before honoring any
withdrawal request, 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(6) (1983) (mutual association must honor
request within thirty days), but this is infrequently invoked. See West Side Fed. Sav.
& Loan v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974) (by-laws require thirty
days notice); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp.
779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979) (accounts redeemable thirty days after request); Capital
Say. & Loan v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (deferment of
payment authorized by statute); C. Henning, W. Pigott & R. Scott, supra note 34, at
133 (payments to share-account holders could be delayed).
48. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984). It is doubtful, however, that a mutual shareholder will be
given the same priority as a general creditor. See infra notes 99-104 and accompany-
ing text.
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taxable income of the association 49 The "hybrid" nature of these
instruments makes it difficult to determine whether the continuity of
proprietary interest requirement has been satisfied.
A. The Nature of the Interest
The continuity-of-proprietary-interest doctrine was developed by
the courts to deny tax-deferred treatment to those transactions that
satisfied the literal requirements of the Code but were essentially
disguised sales.5 0 The doctrine requires the acquiree's shareholders to
obtain a material interest in the affairs of the post-acquisition enter-
prise.5' This requirement is comprised of two elements: First, the
acquired interest must represent a proprietary stake in the enter-
49. I.R.C. § 591(a) (1976). A stock institution, on the other hand, is allowed to
deduct interest paid to its depositors, id. § 163(a), but because it is a corporation, it
may not deduct dividends paid to its shareholders, see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra
note 1, 4.01, at 4-2.
50. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.03, at 14-11; J. Scott, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporate Reorganizations and Divisions § 5.2, at 93-94 (1972);
L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,151, at 74,155; Cohen & Freling, Tax Aspects of Tax-
Free Acquisitions, in Practising Law Institute, Tax, SEC and Acounting Aspects of
Corporate Acquisitions 40-41 (1977); see United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566
(1938) (assumption and payment of transferor's liabilities constitutes boot); Cortland
Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932) (cash and short-term
notes too much like a sale), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). Several other judicial
doctrines have evolved limiting the application of the reorganization provisions,
including: the continuity of business enterprise requirement, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text; the step-transaction doctrine, see infra notes 94-95 and accompa-
nying text; and the business purpose doctrine, see supra note 9.
51. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462, 470 (1933); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332,
334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
The continuity of proprietary interest requirement has been waived for reorgani-
zations involving financially-troubled thrift institutions. I.R.C. § 368(a)(3)(D) (West
Supp. 1983); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.20, at 14-21 (Supp. III 1983).
The merger of savings and loans should be encouraged beyond financially-troubled
institutions. This would enable thrifts to avert financial difficulties before the situa-
tion becomes critical and allow mergers to be consummated on competitive terms.
During the early 1980's, the failure or near failure of thrift institutions was common.
Fingleton, The Thrifts, Forbes, Jan. 3, 1983, at 78; While Congress Fiddles, More
Thrifts Burn, The Economist, Feb. 27, 1982, at 73. Many ailing thrifts were forced to
merge with larger thrifts on unfavorable terms. Id. Although many mutuals are
currently seeking to merge into or convert into stock institutions, see Cieply, The
Thrifts, Forbes, Jan. 2, 1984, at 62, in order to attract investment capital, this does
not mean that mergers of stock institutions into mutual associations should not be
encouraged. Such mergers result in operating efficiencies that may allow the result-
ing institution to survive. The merger may also result in a diversification of the
resulting entity's loan portfolio. Vartanian, supra note 34, at 829. Diversification
lessens the risk of insolvency caused by interest rate fluctuations. Mergers among




prise, 52 and second, the value of the proprietary interest must consti-
tute a substantial part of the value of that which was transferred.53
The first prong of the continuity of proprietary interest doctrine can
be satisfied only if the transferee receives an equity interest in the new
enterprise.5 4 The recipient need not, however, acquire an equity inter-
est in the new enterprise identical to the interest transferred.55 The
receipt of common or preferred stock, whether voting or nonvoting,
has been held to be sufficient when exchanged for common stock.56 A
material change in the substantive character of the transferor's origi-
nal interest, such as a change from equity to debt, however, can cause
the transaction to be characterized as a sale rather than a reorganiza-
tion.5 7 In a mutual-stock acquisition, the inquiry, therefore, must
focus on the nature of the mutual share.
The second prong of the continuity doctrine is a quantitative test
requiring that the equity portion of the consideration received repre-
sent a substantial part of the value of the consideration given up. 5
52. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607
F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420 (1940); B.
Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20.
53. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935); Southwest Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
860 (1951); Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1936); B. Bittker & J.
Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20.
54. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20; see J. Scott, Corpo-
rate Reorganizations and Divisions § 5.201, at 94 n.265 (1972); L. Solomon, supra
note 7, 74,155.2, at 74,157.
55. See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); West Side
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 3 J. Merten,
Merten's Law of Federal Income Tax § 20.59 (rev. ed. 1982).
56. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935) (preferred
stock, even though non-voting, represents a substantial proprietary interest); B.
Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-20 (same); L. Solomon, supra note
7, 74,155.2, at 74,157 (same). In an asset acquisition under § 368(a)(1)(C), how-
ever, the transferee must receive voting stock. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1976).
57. See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 416, 420-21 (1940) ($750,000 in
bonds not a proprietary interest even though secured by the assets transferred in
reorganization); Roebling v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810, 811, 814 (3d Cir.) (100
year bonds not a proprietary interest, merely a creditor's interest), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 773 (1944); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 938, 940 (2d
Cir. 1932) (cash and short-term promissory notes do not satisfy the continuity of
interest doctrine), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); see L. Solomon, supra note 7,
74,155.2, at 74,157.
58. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385 (1935); Southwest Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
860 (1951); L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,155.1, at 74,156; see LeTulle v. Scofield,
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The merger of a stock institution into a mutual association involves
only one instrument-a mutual share. Consequently, the characteri-
zation of the share as debt or equity is determinative of the second
prong of the test as well. s9
B. Characterization of Mutual Shares
1. The Equity Characteristics
With the exception of minimal voting rights granted to borrowers, 60
mutual shares represent the only proprietary interest in the mutual
association. 6' The mutual shareholder has the right to participate in
308 U.S. 415, 420 (1940). The Internal Revenue Service will issue a favorable ruling
with respect to the continuity of proprietary interest requirement if 50% of the
consideration received in an A reorganization is equity. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2
C.B. 568, 569. Less than fifty percent equity, however, has been held to be suffi-
cient. See, e.g., John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 376 (1935) (38%
preferred stock, 62% cash sufficient); Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415, 418 (6th
Cir. 1936) (25% stock, 75% cash sufficient). In a C reorganization, the voting stock
given up by the acquiror must represent at least 80 % of the fair market value of all
the property being acquired. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B) (1982).
59. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1983)(debt characterization, therefore, no continuity), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271
(1984); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir. 1971) (valid
reorganization, mutual shares characterized as voting stock); Capital Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 976 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (same).
As an alternative, the Internal Revenue Service has argued that even if the mutual
shares are found to have sufficient equity characteristics to satisfy the continuity
requirement, the taxpayers have not received solely voting stock or securities in
exchange for their stock. They have instead received an impermissible amount of
boot. Brief for Appellant at 26-27, Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); see Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 607 F.2d 970, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1979). This implies a bifurcation of the mutual
share into an equity interest and a debt interest. The courts have not accepted this
approach and characterize the instrument as either debt or equity. See Paulsen v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 566 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271
(1984); West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th
Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp.
779, 783 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970,
976 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Further, courts have not bifurcated the interests in securities in
cases involving the deductibility of interest, holding that the instruments were either
wholly debt or equity. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder Bros., 367 F.2d 980, 981,
984 (5th Cir. 1966) (pro rata holding by stockholders of subordinated debentures held
not to be indebtedness), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967); Fellinger v. United States,
238 F. Supp. 67, 76-77 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (ten-year debentures held equity), aff'd,
363 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1966); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 4.02, at 4-7.
60. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1983) (borrowing member entitled to one
vote); Ala. Code § 5-16-13(e) (1981) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1151.471 (Page
1968) (borrowers may be provided voting rights). See supra note 42.
61. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
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the profits of the association, 62 share in any liquidation proceeds,6 3
and vote in elections for the board of directors and on other important
business matters such as mergers.6 4 These are the same rights tradi-
tionally associated with corporate stock ownership.6 5 The ownership
of mutual shares, however, also grants rights typically associated with
debt instruments. 66 A mutual-stock acquisition, therefore, involves an
exchange of a pure equity interest for an "equity plus" interest. The
acquiree shareholders' proprietary investment is retained, and they
are granted additional rights. These additional rights do not materi-
ally affect the continuity of a stockholder's proprietary rights and
should not cause the transaction to be treated as a taxable sale.
Mutual shareholders possess one of the primary rights of an equity
holder, the right to share in profits. 67 The payment of dividends to
mutual shareholders is similar to the payment of dividends to stock-
holders of a stock institution. In both instances, dividends must be
404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
473 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
607 F.2d 970, 976 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 246.
62. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.
1971); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779,
782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973
(Ct. Cl. 1979); H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2.
63. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.
1971); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779,
782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973
(Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2.
64. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.
1971); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779,
781-82 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970,
973 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 204.
65. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.31, at 14-94 to 14-95; R.
Harvey, A Hand-Book on Corporation Law 236-37 (1906); H. Henn, supra note 30,
§ 124, at 208; R. Stevens, supra note 30, § 91, at 413. Mutual shareholders have been
held to have additional rights associated with stock ownership. See Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345 (1967) (mutual shareholders entitled to protection under
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 255
(1947) (right to bring stockholders' derivative actions).
66. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
494 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1974); Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357, 360 (10th
Cir. 1971); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp.
779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979); H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2.
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declared by the board of directors, 8 and may be limited when the
entity lacks sufficient earnings.6 9 Thus, dividends are contingent on
management's ability to run the association profitably.
It has been argued that mutual shares, in reality, provide a steady
rate of return"° similar to a savings account, a debt instrument. This is
based on the belief that competition will compel mutual associations
to provide a return comparable to that paid on deposits in commercial
banks and stock institutions. 71 While a comparable rate of return may
indeed be paid, this reasoning ignores the true proprietary nature of a
mutual share. In addition to receiving distributions based on the
association's profits,72 each mutual share represents an undivided in-
terest in a proportionate share of the association's assets and undistrib-
uted profits, which will inure to the shareholders upon liquidation. 73
68. See 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(10) (1983) (mutual association); H. Henn, supra
note 30, § 318, at 630 (corporation); R. Stevens, supra note 30, § 99, at 443 (same).
69. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.14 (1983) (mutual association must limit distributions);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-5412 (1981) ("no dividends shall be declared except from the
earnings and undivided profits of the association"); H. Henn, supra note 30, § 318, at
630 (corporation may make distributions only out of legally available funds); R.
Stevens, supra note 30, § 100, at 448-49 (distributions generally limited when capital
is impaired).
70. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984).
71. Id. at 567-68. In practice, this will probably be true. Equal rates of return,
however, do not make investment instruments identical. In addition to this return,
mutual shareholders may benefit from the undistributed earnings of the association.
See infra note 73.
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. See Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983) (net earnings
and any surplus), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); Rev. Rul. 69-646, 1969-2
C.B. 54 (undistributed earnings of the association effectively distributed pro-rata in
form of acquiror's capital stock). Mutual shareholders will not benefit from the
association's undistributed earnings by redeeming their shares because the withdraw-
able value of the shares does not change. H. Russell, supra note 34, at 282. They will,
however, benefit from such earnings in several situations. First, upon liquidation,
each mutual shareholder is entitled to his pro-rata share of the remaining assets.
E.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404,
409 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 973
(Ct. Cl. 1979); see H. Russell, supra note 34, at 2. Second, should the association
become acquired by a stock institution, mutual shareholders may receive, in ex-
change for their liquidation rights, either stock in the acquiror, see Rev. Rul. 69-646,
1969-2 C.B. 54, 55, or a pro-rata interest in a liquidation account in an amount equal
to the net worth of the mutual asociation, see LTR 8,346,052 (Aug. 16, 1983); LTR
8,327,088 (Apr. 8, 1983). This account gives the mutual shareholders priority over
stockholders in the event of a liquidation of the stock institution, to the extent of their
interest in the account, and is reduced to reflect subsequent withdrawals from the
savings accounts. See LTR 8,346,052 (Aug. 16, 1983); LTR 8,327,088 (Apr. 8, 1983).
Third, in a mutual-to-stock conversion, the mutual shareholders receive an interest in
a similar liquidation account. See LTR 8,333,098 (May 19, 1983); LTR 8,333,061
(May 18, 1983); LTR 8,327,044 (April 6, 1983); LTR 8,310,078 (Dec. 9, 1982).
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It has been suggested that the value of these rights is speculative and
immaterial because a solvent association is highly unlikely to liqui-
date.74 This assertion, however, does not recognize that mutual share-
holders also benefit from these rights if the association is converted
into or acquired by a stock institution, 75 not an uncommon bccur-
rence.76 The liquidation rights, therefore, along with the right to
share in the association's distributed and undistributed earnings, rep-
resent a proprietary interest in the mutual association similar to a
stockholder's interest in a stock institution.
The right to participate in the management of the enterprise"7 is
another indicator of the nature of the interest held by mutual share-
holders. Mutual shareholders vote for directors and on other matters
affecting the enterprise. 78 Their counterparts in a stock institution, the
stockholders, vote in similar corporate elections. 79 The materiality of
the mutual shareholder's voting rights has been questioned in two
respects. First, in practice, many mutual shareholders sign proxies
when they invest in the association, and thus it is argued that such
voting rights are illusory. 0 This practice of voting by proxy, however,
is no different than that used by many corporations.8 Further, in
either enterprise, the proxy is revocable.82 Thus, the right to vote is no
more illusory than that of a corporate stockholder. Second, the mutual
shareholder's voting rights may be limited to a maximum number of
votes, regardless of the number of shares owned.8 3 While this reduces
74. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984).
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., LTR 8,346,052 (Aug. 16, 1983) (stock acquiring mutual); LTR
8,327,088 (April 8, 1983) (same); LTR 8,333,098 (May 19, 1983) (mutual converting
to stock); LTR 8,333,061 (May 18, 1983) (same); LTR 8,327,044 (April 6, 1983)
(same); see Cieply, supra note 51, at 62; Vartanian, supra note 34, at 828-29.
77. This is represented by the right to vote. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
78. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1983); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-5305 (1981);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 33.20.010 (West Supp. 1983).
79. H. Henn, supra note 30, § 189, at 363-64 ; R. Stevens, supra note 30, § 112,
at 517-18.
80. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); York v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 624 F.2d 495, 497
n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1043 (1980). See generally H. Russell, supra
note 34, at 204 (discussing savings association proxies).
81. See H. Henn, supra note 30, § 196, at 381-82; R. Stevens, supra note 30,
§ 118, at 532.
82. See H. Henn, supra note 30, § 196, at 383 (corporations); H. Russell, supra
note 34, at 206 (mutual associations); R. Stevens, supra note 30, § 118, at 533
(corporations).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(4) (1983) (federal mutual association shareholders enti-
tled to one vote per $100 on deposit, limited to 50 votes); see Paulsen v. Commis-
sioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West
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the voting rights of a mutual shareholder, it does not materially affect
the continuity of the acquiree stockholders' proprietary rights. The
continuity-of-proprietary-interest doctrine does not require that the
interest received be identical to the interest transferred, 84 and the
receipt of nonvoting stock will satisfy the continuity requirement. 85
This limitation on voting rights, therefore, should not adversely affect
the characterization of a mutual-stock acquisition as a reorganization.
The proprietary rights of a mutual shareholder arguably differ from
those held by ordinary stockholders because they have a greater poten-
tial to be infinitely dilutable.8 Any additional transfer of funds to the
association increases the total number of shares outstanding. This
increases the transferor's proportionate interest in the entity and re-
duces the relative interest of the other shareholders. This dilution of
proportionate interest may also be encountered by a corporate stock-
holder. In the absence of preemptive rights, 7 a stockholder's interest
would be diluted if the corporation issues and sells additional shares.
In addition, federal law permits the board of directors to limit the
amount of capital that may be accepted for deposit, 88 and thus, the
number of shares outstanding. This has the effect of preventing dilu-
tion beyond acceptable limits. The proprietary interest of a mutual
shareholder, therefore, is substantially similar to the proprietary inter-
est of a corporate stockholder.
Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 406 (6th Cir. 1974);
Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 781 (D.
Wyo. 1979); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 32, 33
(N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980).
84. See Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); West Side
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 3 J. Merten,
supra note 55, § 20.59, at 254.
85. E.g., John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935) (preferred
stock represents a definite and substantial interest in acquiring corporation); see West
Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 407 (6th Cir. 1974). This
will not, however, satisfy the statutory "solely for all or a part of its voting stock"
requirement of an asset acquisition. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1976). The preferred
stock would have to carry with it an unconditional right to vote. Cohen, Tax-Free
Acquisitions, in Practising Law Institute, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Corporate
Acquisitions 64, 73 (1972).
86. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984). On the other hand, they are infinitely inflatable because any
redemption of mutual shares increases the remaining shareholders' proportionate
interest in the association.
87. In many jurisdictions, the articles of incorporation may limit or deny pre-
emptive rights. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.130 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 351.305 (Vernon 1966); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-24 (1960); see H.
Henn, supra note 30, § 127, at 215; R. Stevens, supra note 30, § 111, at 503.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 544.5(7)(e) (1983).
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2. Debt Characteristics-Negating Their Effect
The analysis of a mutual-stock acquisition differs from that of a
traditional reorganization because there is no change in interest.
Rather, the acquiree shareholders receive rights in addition to their
original proprietary rights. The stockholders become owners of the
mutual association 9 just as they were before the transaction. This
transfer of proprietary rights should be sufficient to satisfy the conti-
nuity requirement. The additional rights received, however, are typi-
cally associated with debt instruments. These rights may include the
right to be treated as a general creditor upon liquidation ° and the
qualified right to liquidate their investments on demand. 91 As a result,
the interest of the mutual shareholder may cross into the realm of a
non-equity interest. The effect of these debt-like characteristics may
be negated, and the likelihood of reorganization treatment increased,
if proper restrictions are placed on the mutual shares as part of the
merger agreement.
Mutual shareholders have a qualified right to liquidate their invest-
ments on demand. The savings and loan charter may allow the associ-
ation to require that shareholders give at least thirty days notice of
their intention to redeem their shares.9 This restriction, however, is
usually not imposed.9 3 Although the right to liquidate does not make a
mutual share the equivalent of a demand deposit, it does make the
instrument similar to a thirty-day demand note. In order to avoid
such a characterization, restrictions can be placed on the right to
redeem mutual shares received in the merger. This restriction would
ensure preservation of the ownership interest for a certain period of
time. In addition, such a restriction avoids application of the step-
transaction doctrine 4 which may collapse the exchange for mutual
89. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d
404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607 F.2d 970,
976 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
90. See Paulsen v. Commisioner, 716 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984). This right, however, may not have been correctly
interpreted in Paulsen. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 47.
92. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a)(6) (1983); see, e.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
563, 565 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); West Side Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979).
93. See West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404, 411
(6th Cir. 1974); Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 473 F.
Supp. 779, 782 (D. Wyo. 1979); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607
F.2d 970, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
94. The step-transaction doctrine is another judicial limitation on reorganiza-
tions that emphasizes the substance of a transaction over its form. See McDonald's
Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982); Red-
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shares and subsequent redemptions into a single transaction, 5 result-
ing in a taxable sale.
Federal securities law requires that securities be held for at least
two years to establish that they were purchased for investment and
not resale.96 Such a standard can be applied to a stock-mutual merger.
An extended holding period implies that the mutual shares are held
for investment and would rebut the argument that the acquiree's
shareholders have "cashed in" their position. Time restrictions on the
right to redeem mutual shares will ensure that the merger and subse-
quent redemptions of mutual shares are treated as separate transac-
tions. 97
Even if the shareholder were required to hold his shares for a
specified period of time, he could effectively "cash in" his investment
by borrowing against the shares. 98 Thus, restrictions should be placed
on the ability to pledge the shares to prevent the shareholder from
"'cashing in" his investment.
Placing the mutual shareholder on an equal footing with general
creditors militates against reorganization treatment. In Paulsen v.
Commissioner,99 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted prior California decisions as granting general creditor status to
mutual shareholders upon liquidation.100 This would represent a sub-
stantial change in the equity-risk position'01 of the investor potentially
ding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
913 (1981); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12
Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 247, 247 (1954).
95. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.51, at 14-131; J. Scott, supra
note 54, § 5.203, at 101; L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,176, at 74,162.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1983); see United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp.
480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); D. Goldwasser, The Practitioner's Comprehensive Guide
To Rule 144, at 199 (2d ed. 1978). Prior to the adoption of Rule 144, either a change-
of-circumstances test was used to determine whether securities were purchased for
investment, see D. Goldwasser, supra, at 33-35; Mandelstam, How Long Must I
Hold?, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 173, 179 (1970), or a flexible holding period standard,
D. Goldwasser, supra, at 28-33, Mandelstam, supra, at 177-79.
97. The length of time between transactions, although not determinative, is one
factor used by courts in determining the applicability of the step-transaction doc-
trine. See J. Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation
§ 32.07, at 3252 (1983); L. Solomon, supra note 7, 74,176, at 74,162; Mintz &
Plumb, supra note 94, at 249.
98. This persuaded the Ninth Circuit in Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984), to find that the stock institu-
tion shareholders had cashed in their investment. Id. at 568. In this case, the merger
agreement authorized the shareholders of the acquiree to borrow against their mu-
tual shares at preferred rates. Id. The mutual shares were found to be "essentially the
equivalent of cash." Id. at 569.
99. 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984).
100. Id. at 568.
101. A change in the risk associated solely with the nature of the investment
represents a substantive change in" the taxpayer's investment that may result in the
1984] 1277
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
warranting taxation of the transaction. Upon closer examination,
however, these decisions merely recognize that membership share-
holders10 2 in a stock institution, who are depositors with limited voting
rights, have priority over the stockholders. 103 Membership sharehold-
ers are not subordinated to the claims of general creditors. 0 4 There-
fore, mutual shareholders, even if treated as membership sharehold-
ers, would be subordinated to the claims of general creditors. 0 5 Even
in a jurisdiction that grants mutual shareholders the same priority as
general creditors, 06 the acquisition agreement can provide that the
acquiree's shareholders will be subordinated to the claims of general
creditors. The mutual-stock acquisition, therefore, should not result in
a substantial change of the equity-risk position of the stockholder and
should not affect the characterization of the mutual share.
Finally, dividends paid to mutual shareholders are deductible' 7 in
computing the taxable income of the association, just as interest on
indebtedness is deductible. 08 It has been argued that this precludes
classifying mutual shares as equity. 10 9 Such an argument ignores the
rationale for the deduction. Mutual associations were originally ex-
empt from income tax. " 0 The exemption was removed by the Revenue
Act of 1951"' which simultaneously provided for the deduction." 2
transaction failing to satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest requirement. See
id. at 569; McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 523
(7th Cir. 1982); J. Scott, supra note 54, § 5.201, at 94.
102. Membership shareholders are members in a stock institution but have limited
voting rights and have no right to the undistributed earnings of the institution. See In
re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 141, 99 P.2d 251, 254 (1940).
103. See Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 514 F.2d 1199, 1207 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15
Cal. 2d 134, 142, 99 P.2d 251, 254 (1940).
104. See Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 514 F.2d 1199, 1207 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15
Cal. 2d 134, 142, 99 P.2d 251, 254 (1940).
105. In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 142, 99 P.2d 251, 254
(1940); In other states, mutual shareholders are statutorily subordinated to the claims
of general creditors. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 665.0601 (West Supp. 1984); Va.
Code § 6.1-195.14 (1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 33.20.010 (Supp. 1983).
106. See Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984); Md. Fin. Inst. Code Ann. § 9.329 (1980).
107. I.R.C. § 591 (1976). In addition, it is argued that mutual shares are more like
debt because the dividends received are not entitled to the dividend exclusion. Id. §
116(c)(1). Dividends from foreign corporations or regulated investment companies
also do not qualify for the exclusion. Id. § 116(d). Therefore, this is not determinative
as to whether a particular interest is debt or equity.
108. I.R.C. § 163 (1976).
109. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1271 (1984).
110. I.R.C. § 101 (Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 640A (1952)).
111. Ch. 521, § 313(a), 65 Stat. 452, 490; see S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
28, reprinted in 1951 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1969, 1996.
112. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 313(f), 65 Stat. 452, 491.
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The purpose of the Act was to prevent the accumulation of tax-exempt
income in mutual associations."13 Accordingly, a deduction was
granted for distributions made by mutual associations.11 4 Thus, the
deduction of dividends does not support the classification of the shares
as debt.
Although mutual shareholders clearly retain a substantial interest in
a mutual association, it is uncertain whether that interest is suffi-
ciently similar to the stockholder's proprietary interest in a stock
institution to qualify the transaction for reorganization treatment.
Proper planning, however, increases the likelihood of favorable treat-
ment.
CONCLUSION
A mutual-stock acquisition is not readily characterized as a tax-
deferred reorganization because of the unique capital structure of
mutual associations. The transaction should be accorded reorganiza-
tion treatment because "the nature and extent of [the stockholder's]
continued participation in the corporation's control, earnings, and
assets, and the relationship of their interests to those of other share-
holders and security holders after the transaction has been consum-
mated""15 remains unchanged. Further, by following the suggestions
contained herein, the debt characteristics of mutual shares can be
minimized to a point where they do not affect the continuity of the
shareholders' investment interest. Mutual-stock acquisitions, there-
fore, should be found to satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest
doctrine and thereby qualify as tax-deferred reorganizations.
Michael L. Gobbo
113. See Midwest Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 262, 266-67 (1980); Hud-
son City Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 70, 74-75 (1969).
114. See Midwest Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 262, 266-67 (1980); Hud-
son City Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 70, 74-75 (1969).
115. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 1, 14.11, at 14-18.
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